The Politics Of Bureaucracy An Introduction To Comparative Public Administration

Written by B. Guy Peters, a leading authority in the field, this comprehensive exploration of the political and policy making roles of public bureaucracies is now available in a fully revised seventh edition, offering extensive, well-documented comparative analysis of the effects of politics on bureaucracy. Updates to this edition include: All new coverage of public administration in Latin America and Africa, with special attention paid to the impact of New Public Management and other ideas for reform; An examination of the European Union and its effects on public policy and public administration in member countries, as well as an exploration of the EU as a particular type of bureaucracy; A renewed emphasis on coordination and the role of central agencies; A thorough assessment of 'internationalization' of bureaucracies and concerns with the role of international pressures on domestic governments and organizations in the public sector; Coverage of the wide-ranging impacts of the 2008 economic slowdown on public bureaucracies and public policies, and the varied success of governmental responses to the crisis. Drawing on evidence from a wide variety of political systems, The Politics of Bureaucracy, Seventh Edition, continues to be essential reading for all students of government, policy analysis, politics, and international relations.

Bureaucrats are important symbols of the governments that employ them. Contrary to popular stereotypes, they determine much about the way policy is ultimately enacted and experienced by citizens. While we know a great deal about bureaucrats and their actions, we know little about their development. Are particular types of people drawn to government work, or are government workers forged by the agencies they work in? Put simply, are bureaucrats born, or are they made? In Becoming Bureaucrats, Zachary W. Oberfield traces the paths of two sets of public servants—police officers and welfare caseworkers—from their first day on the job through the end of their second year. Examining original data derived from surveys and in-depth interviews, along with ethnographic observations from the author's year of training and work as a welfare caseworker, Becoming Bureaucrats charts how public-sector entrants develop their bureaucratic identities, motivations, and attitudes. Ranging from individual stories to population-wide statistical analysis, Oberfield’s study complicates the long-standing cliché that bureaucracies churn out bureaucrats with mechanical efficiency. He demonstrates that entrants' bureaucratic personalities evolved but remained strongly tied to the views, identities, and motives that they articulated at the outset of their service. As such, he argues that who bureaucrats become and, as a result, how bureaucracies function, depends strongly on patterns of self-selection and recruitment. Becoming Bureaucrats not only enriches our theoretical understanding of bureaucratic behavior but also provides practical advice to elected officials and public managers on building responsive, accountable workforces.

The classic book on the way American government agencies work and how they can be made to work better -- the "masterwork" of political scientist James Q. Wilson (The Economist) In Bureaucracy, the distinguished scholar James Q. Wilson examines a wide range of bureaucracies, including the US Army, the FBI, the CIA, the FCC, and the Social Security Administration, providing the first comprehensive, in-depth analysis of what government agencies do, why they operate the way they do, and how they might become more responsible and effective. It is the essential guide to understanding how American government works.

Public Administration Evolving: From Foundations to the Future demonstrates how the theory and practice of public administration has evolved since the early decades of the twentieth century. Each chapter approaches the field from a unique perspective and describes the seminal events that have been influential in shaping its evolution. This book presents major trends in theory and practice in the field, provides an overview of its intellectual development, and demonstrates how it has professionalized. The range from modernism to metamodernism is reflected from the perspective of accomplished scholars in the field, each of whom captures the history, environment, and development of a particular dimension of public administration. Taken together, the chapters leave us with an understanding of where we are today and a grounding for forecasting the future.
In Bureaucracy’s Masters and Minions: The Politics of Controlling the U.S. Bureaucracy, the author argues that political control of the bureaucracy from the president and the Congress is largely contingent on an agency’s internal characteristics of workforce composition, workforce responsibilities, and workforce organization. Through a revised principal-agent framework, the author explores an agent-principal model to use the agent as the starting-point of analysis. The author tests the agent-principal model across 14 years and 132 bureaus and finds that both the president and the House of Representatives exert influence over the bureaucracy, but agency characteristics such as the degree of politization among the workforce, the type of work the agency is engaged in, and the hierarchical nature of the agency affects how agencies are controlled by their political masters. In a detailed case study of one agency, the U.S. Department of Education, the author finds that education policy over a 65-year period is elite-led, and that the hierarchical nature of the department conditions political principals’ influence. This book works to overcome three hurdles that have plagued bureaucratic studies: the difficulty of uniform sampling across the bureaucracy, the overuse of case studies, and the overreliance on the principal-agent theoretical approach.

Much of this new edition has been rewritten and it contains a new chapter on the experience of Third World countries. It assesses both bureaucracy involved in implementing government policy and the role of outsiders in the implementation of policy.

Although a powerful, independent bureaucracy poses a threat to democracy, it is indispensable to its proper functioning. This book provides an overview of the complex relationship between bureaucracy and the politics of democracy and is essential reading for students of sociology, political science and public administration. It is designed to guide students through the maze of classical and modern theories on the topic, to give them basic information on the historical developments in this area and the present them with case histories of the actual relationship between bureaucrats and politicians in democratic societies.

Although everyone agrees on the need to make government work better, few understand public bureaucracy sufficiently well to offer useful suggestions, either theoretical or practical. In fact, some consider bureaucratic efficiency incompatible with democratic government. Douglas Yates places the often competing aims of efficiency and democracy in historical perspective and then presents a unique and systematic theory of the politics of bureaucracy, which he illustrates with examples from recent history and from empirical research. He argues that the United States operates under a system of “bureaucratic democracy,” in which governmental decisions increasingly are made in bureaucratic settings, out of the public eye. He describes the rational, self-interested bureaucrat as a “minimaxer,” who inches forward inconspicuously, gradually accumulating larger budgets and greater power, in an atmosphere of segmented pluralism, of conflict and competition, of silent politics. To make the policy process more competitive, democratic, and open, Yates calls for strategic debate among policymakers and bureaucrats and insists that bureaucrats should give a public accounting of their significant decisions rather than bury them in incremental changes. He offers concrete proposals, applicable to federal, state, and local governments, for simplifying the now-chaotic bureaucratic policymaking system and at the same time bolstering representation and openness. This is a book for all political scientists, policymakers, government officials, and concerned citizens. It may well become a classic statement on the workings of public bureaucracy.

Br> Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional Choice by Knott, Jack H.; Miller, Gary J. Terms of use Shows how modern public bureaucracies share a common set of institutional rules determining the internal patterns of decision-making and external relationships with other political factors. Descriptive content provided by Syndetics™ a Bowker service.

Bureaucracy despised, disparaged, and defended -- What citizens experience from bureaucracy -- More bureaucracy myths to delete -- Ask the impossible of bureaucracy? Easy! -- Looking closer at those bureaucrats -- Bureaucratic bigness and badness reconsidered -- Fads and fundamentals of bureaucracy.

The Political Economy of Bureaucracy applies Public Choice theory and a complex systems view of government institutions to analyze policy implementation as an economic process. It addresses the common and vexing question of why managing federal agencies for results is so difficult by challenging traditional assumptions of institutional design and policy analysis. Using creative methods that focus on relationships that constrain the choices of executives and managers in a political hierarchy, the author reveals control and coordination as goals that are imperfectly achieved and often conflicting with one another. Despite decades of intense study, serious reform efforts and impressive technological advances, the U.S. government remains a typical bureaucracy that fails to meet citizens’ expectations. Clearly, policy analysis is missing something. The problem may rest with “machine” models of government. Rules, especially those governing expenditures, are assumed to be feasible and effective. Analysis of the federal government as a complex system of relationships between semi-autonomous agents helps explain the disconnect between policy and results. The solution is to roll back micro-management of ends and means; policymakers should focus on objectives and facilitate implementation by selectively relaxing constraints that prevent experimentation needed to determine the most effective methods. This book devotes unusual attention to the interaction between executive and legislative branches of government and between political appointees and career civil servants. Most studies of government policy take existing institutional structure for granted. Different conclusions emerge from this analysis by virtue of the systems view that accepts status quo hierarchies but questions the effectiveness of the rules that govern policy implementation. This book
will be of interest to postgraduates and researchers focussing on Economic Theory, Public Choice, Institutional Economics and Political Science, as well as to those working in the public sector interested in Public Administration, Public Policy, and Organizational Behavior.

This best-selling textbook is unique because of its focus on the political side of bureaucracy. Presenting bureaucracy as a political institution, this book covers the controls on bureaucracy and how bureaucracy makes policy. It is known for its current survey of the political science literature and interesting topical examples and case studies.

The second edition includes reviews of Jeffersonian impacts on administrative theory and practice and Jacksonian developments in national administrative structures and functions, a look at the administrative theorizing that presaged progressive reforms in civil service, and insight into the confounding complexities that characterize public thinking about administration in a postmodern political order.

The bureaucracy is the fourth branch of government, often receiving attention in times of emergency or when it is the object of criticism from the media or politicians. Less understood is how bureaucratic institutions function in a democracy, both from an organizational perspective and as institutional participants within the political arena. Drawing on rational choice approaches, computationally intensive data and modeling techniques, and systematic empirical inquiry, this original collection of essays highlights the important role bureaucracies play in shaping public policy-making. The editors of and contributors to this volume demonstrate not only the constraints political officials face in harnessing the bureaucracy but, more important, how bureaucracies function as organizational entities in diverse contexts. George A. Krause is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of South Carolina. Kenneth J. Meier is Charles Puryear Professor of Liberal Arts and Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University.

Here is the first scholarly book-length analysis of Communist Vietnam's political system. Taking advantage of the unprecedented wealth of revealing documentary material published in Vietnam since 1985, Gareth Porter offers new insights into the functioning of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and its management of the Vietnamese economy and society. He examines the evolution of the system from the time the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was founded in 1945 through the 1986-1990 period of economic liberalization and cautious political reform by the successor regime, the SRV.

One of the major dilemmas facing the administrative state in the United States today is discerning how best to harness for public purposes the dynamism of markets, the passion and commitment of nonprofit and volunteer organizations, and the public-interest-oriented expertise of the career civil service. Researchers across a variety of disciplines, fields, and subfields have independently investigated aspects of the formidable challenges, choices, and opportunities this dilemma poses for governance, democratic constitutionalism, and theory building. This literature is vast, affords multiple and conflicting perspectives, is methodologically diverse, and is fragmented. The Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy affords readers an uncommon overview and integration of this eclectic body of knowledge as adduced by many of its most respected researchers. Each of the chapters identifies major issues and trends, critically takes stock of the state of knowledge, and ponders where future research is most promising. Unprecedented in scope, methodological diversity, scholarly viewpoint, and substantive integration, this volume is invaluable for assessing where the study of American bureaucracy stands at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, and where leading scholars think it should go in the future. The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics are a set of reference books offering authoritative and engaging critical overviews of the state of scholarship on American politics. Each volume focuses on a particular aspect of the field. The project is under the General Editorship of George C. Edwards III, and distinguished specialists in their respective fields edit each volume. The Handbooks aim not just to report on the discipline, but also to shape it as scholars critically assess the scholarship on a topic and propose directions in which it needs to move. The series is an indispensable reference for anyone working in American politics. General Editor for The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics: George C. Edwards III

Bureaucracy is an age-old form of government that has survived since ancient times; it has provided order and persisted with durability, dependability, and stability. The popularity of the first edition of this book, entitled Handbook of Bureaucracy, is testimony to the endurance of bureaucratic institutions. Reflecting the accelerated globalization of corporate capitalism, cultures, and governance systems and the additional complexity in the tasks of public administrators, Bureaucracy and Administration presents a comprehensive, global perspective that highlights the dramatic changes of the last 15 years in governance, business, and public administration. Reflects Dramatic Changes in Governance, Business, and Public Administration Through articles contributed by international experts, this volume provides a thorough analysis of bureaucracies worldwide and their effect on politics, economics, and society. The book begins by exploring the historical antecedents of bureaucracy, looking at some of the great ancient civilizations and their administrative traditions, achievements, and contributions to modern administration and governance systems. In the next section, leading scholars from political science, sociology, governance, and public administration present a detailed review of theoretical and conceptual perspectives on bureaucracies and bureaucratic politics. Following an examination of bureaucracy and public management and presenting topics such as the response to Hurricane Katrina, training of bureaucrats, and ethical issues, contributors review bureaucratic politics in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The book concludes with a focused analysis of bureaucracy, change, reform, and revolution, highlighting implications for future governance and administration. Comprising theoretical and empirical analyses and including perspectives which span from ancient to modern times, this volume comprehensively and authoritatively advances the knowledge of the nature, role, and function of bureaucracy as the core of sound governance and administration around
Although everyone agrees on the need to make government work better, few understand public bureaucracy sufficiently well. The book aims to explain the emergence of the Norwegian—and to some extent, the Scandinavian—welfare state in historical and anthropological terms. Halvard Vike argues that particular forms of political grassroots mobilization contributed heavily to what he calls “a low level of gravity state”—a political order in which decentralized institutions make it possible to curtail centralizing forces. While there is a large international literature on the Nordic welfare states, there is limited knowledge about how these states are embedded in local contexts. Vike’s approach is based on an ethnographic practice which may be labeled “in and out of institutions.” It is based on ethnographic work in municipal assemblies, local bureaucracies, political parties, voluntary organizations, and various informal contexts.

Until now political scientists have devoted little attention to the origins of American bureaucracy and the relationship between bureaucratic and interest group politics. In this pioneering book, Daniel Carpenter contributes to our understanding of institutions by presenting a unified study of bureaucratic autonomy in democratic regimes. He focuses on the emergence of bureaucratic policy innovation in the United States during the Progressive Era, asking why the Post Office Department and the Department of Agriculture became politically independent authors of new policy and why the Interior Department did not. To explain these developments, Carpenter offers a new theory of bureaucratic autonomy grounded in organization theory, rational choice models, and network concepts. According to the author, bureaucracies with unique goals achieve autonomy when their middle-level officials establish reputations among diverse coalitions for effectively providing unique services. These coalitions enable agencies to resist political control and make it costly for politicians to ignore the agencies’ ideas. Carpenter assesses his argument through a highly innovative combination of historical narratives, statistical analyses, counterfactuals, and carefully structured policy comparisons. Along the way, he reinterprets the rise of national foods and drug regulation, Comstockery and the Progressive anti-vice movement, the emergence of American conservation policy, the ascent of the farm lobby, the creation of postal savings banks and free rural mail delivery, and even the congressional Cannon Revolt of 1910.

The call to “reinvent government”—to reform the government bureaucracy of the United States—resonates as loudly from elected officials as from the public. Examining the political and economic forces that have shaped the American civil service system from its beginnings in 1883 through today, the authors of this volume explain why, despite attempts at an overhaul, significant change in the bureaucracy remains a formidable challenge.

Gordon Tullock is among a small group of living legends in the field of political economics. This volume provides an entree to the mind of an original thinker. Professor Rowley provides deliberately sparse contextual introduction to each volume, opting to allow the very able and eloquent Tullock to speak for himself.

The first edition of Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy is one of the most successful Brookings titles of all time. This thoroughly revised version updates that classic analysis of the role played by the federal bureaucracy—civilian career officials, political appointees, and military officers—and Congress in formulating U.S. national security policy, illustrating how policy decisions are actually made. Government agencies, departments, and individuals all have certain interests to preserve and promote. Those priorities, and the conflicts they sometimes spark, heavily influence the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. A decision that looks like an orchestrated attempt to influence another country may in fact represent a shaky compromise between rival elements within the U.S. government. The authors provide numerous examples of bureaucratic maneuvering and reveal how they have influenced our international relations. The revised edition includes new examples of bureaucratic politics from the past three decades, from Jimmy Carter’s view of the State Department to conflicts between George W. Bush and the bureaucracy regarding Iraq. The second edition also includes a new analysis of Congress’s role in the politics of foreign policymaking.

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many questioned whether the large number of political appointees in the Federal Emergency Management Agency contributed to the agency’s poor handling of the catastrophe, ultimately costing hundreds of lives and causing immeasurable pain and suffering. The Politics of Presidential Appointments examines in depth how and why presidents use political appointees and how their choices impact government performance—for better or worse. One way presidents can influence the permanent bureaucracy is by filling key posts with people who are sympathetic to their policy goals. But if the president’s appointees lack competence and an agency fails in its mission—as with Katrina—the president is accused of employing his friends and allies to the detriment of the public. Through case studies and cutting-edge analysis, David Lewis takes a fascinating look at presidential appointments dating back to the 1960s to learn which jobs went to appointees, which agencies were more likely to have appointees, how the use of appointees varied by administration, and how it affected agency performance. He argues that presidents politicize even when it hurts performance—and often with support from Congress—because they need agencies to be responsive to presidential direction. He shows how agency missions and personnel—and whether they line up with the president’s vision—determine which agencies presidents target with appointees, and he sheds new light on the important role patronage plays in appointment decisions.
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The rise of the administrative state is the most significant political development in American politics over the past century. While our Constitution separates powers into three branches, and requires that the laws are made by elected representatives in the Congress, today most policies are made by unelected officials in agencies where legislative, executive, and judicial powers are combined. This threatens constitutionalism and the rule of law. This book examines the history of administrative power in America and argues that modern administrative law has failed to protect the principles of American constitutionalism as effectively as earlier approaches to regulation and administration.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

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The implementation of welfare reform in North Carolina provided an opportunity to explore theories of welfare reform implementation and theories of bureaucratic power. While welfare reform implementation proceeded smoothly in many states, the unique political climate in North Carolina in 1996 forced a more transparent view of bureaucratic development and growing political independence. The political capacity of the bureaucracy to influence policy implementation contrary to legislative intent is often discussed but infrequently documented, and this work opens this subject for additional debate.

A revealing look at how today's bureaucrats are finding their public voice in the era of 24-hour media. Once relegated to the anonymous back rooms of democratic debate, our bureaucratic leaders are increasingly having to govern under the scrutiny of a 24-hour news cycle, hyperpartisan political oversight, and a restless populace that is increasingly distrustful of the people who govern them. Megaphone Bureaucracy reveals how today's civil servants are finding a voice of their own as they join elected politicians on the public stage and jockey for advantage in the persuasion game of modern governance. In this timely and incisive book, Dennis Grube draws on in-depth interviews and compelling case studies from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand to describe how senior bureaucrats are finding themselves drawn into political debates they could once avoid. Faced with a political climate where polarization and media spin are at an all-time high, these modern mandarins negotiate blame games and manage contradictory expectations in the glare of an unforgiving spotlight. Grube argues that in this fiercely divided public square a new style of bureaucratic leadership is emerging, one that marries the robust independence of Washington agency heads with the prudent political neutrality of Westminster civil servants. These "Washminster" leaders do not avoid the public gaze, nor do they overtly court political controversy. Rather, they use their increasingly public pulpits to exert their own brand of persuasive power. Megaphone Bureaucracy shows how today's senior bureaucrats are making their voices heard by embracing a new style of communication that brings with it great danger but also great opportunity.

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